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ABSTRACT
As in many countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Sweden), concentrated
ownership was a ubiquitous feature of the Indian private sector over the past seven decades. Yet,
unlike in most countries, the identity of the primary families responsible for the concentrated
ownership changes dramatically over time. The resulting turnover is perhaps even more than
turnover in leading U.S. firms over the same time period. It does not appear that concentrated
ownership in India is entirely associated with the ills that the literature has recently ascribed to it in
emerging markets. If the concentrated owners are not exclusively, or even primarily, engaged in
rent-seeking and entry-deterring behavior, concentrated ownership may not be inimical to
competition. Indeed, as a response to competition, we argue that at least some Indian families have
consistently tried to leverage internal markets for capital and talent inherent in business group
structures to launch new ventures in environments where external factor markets are deficient. In
the process they have either failed hence the turnover in identity or reinvented themselves. Thus
concentrated ownership is a result, rather than a cause, of inefficiencies in markets.
Even in the low capital-intensity, relatively unregulated setting of the Indian software
industry, we find that concentrated ownership persists in a privately successful and socially useful
way. Since this setting is the least hospitable to the existence of concentrated ownership, we
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I. Introduction   
 
Concentrated ownership has been an important feature of the Indian private sector 
for the past seven decades.  In this respect, India is no different from several other 
countries, including Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Sweden.  However, we 
show that, unlike in these countries, the identity of the primary families responsible for 
the concentrated ownership changes dramatically over time. In fact, by some measures 
the changes are even more dramatic than in a comparable set of U.S. data.   
Concentrated ownership exists at any point in time because of institutional voids, 
the absence of specialized intermediaries in capital markets (Khanna and Palepu 1997, 
2000a). However if these concentrated owners are not exclusively, or even primarily, 
engaged in rent-seeking and entry-deterring behavior, there is no intrinsic reason why 
concentrated ownership is inimical to competition. Indeed, as a response to competition, 
we argue that at least some Indian families – the concentrated owners in question – have 
consistently tried to use their business group structures to launch new ventures. In the 
process they have either failed – hence the turnover in identity – or reinvented 
themselves.  
Further, family-owned business groups, typically diversified over several 
industries, can co-exist with specialist firms focused on a particular industry.  We 
demonstrate this through an examination of the history of India’s globally competitive 
software industry.  This is an intriguing setting in which to explore the role of 
concentrated ownership since it is the setting least hospitable to the advantages that 
groups might have.  We argue that groups’ generally advantageous access to capital and 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Randall Morck for coordinating and spearheading the project on the History of 
Concentrated Ownership at the National Bureau of Economic Research, to Dr. Gita Piramal (Mumbai, 
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talent through internal markets – when external markets do not work as well – offers less 
of an advantage, if any, in this setting.  Here groups are also least able to influence 
regulations, since the sector is one of the few left untouched by vestiges of India’s famed 
regulatory miasma, the License Raj. Yet it turns out that concentrated ownership, in the 
guise of business groups, plays a defining and prominent role even in this inhospitable 
setting, and does so in a way that is not inimical to entry from de novo entrepreneurs. We 
interpret the privately successful and socially useful persistence of groups in the software 
industry as a lower bound on the persistence of concentrated ownership in the economy 
writ large. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II begins with a sweeping 
overview of dominant business groups in India over the past century. We show that, 
while particular families have acted as concentrated owners at each of three points in time 
in the past seven decades, the identity of these families has changed drastically over this 
time period.  We then consider two, not mutually exclusive, explanations for the 
persistence of concentrated ownership. The first (Section III) is political relationships 
between dominant families and the power structure. The second (Section IV) is a process 
of entrepreneurship by the dominant families.  From these sections we conclude that it is 
difficult to tell a story of concentrated ownership resulting purely in stasis and rent-
seeking. Section V characterizes changes in India during the last decade as moving 
towards less regulation and government intervention and toward freer markets. Even in 
this setting, we point out that family-based business groups continue to thrive.  Finally, in 
Section VI, we study the software industry. 
 
II. A Brief History of Corporate Ownership in India 
 
While there has been organized economic activity in India for hundreds of years, 
it was relatively fragmented till the advent of the British Raj.  Under the Mughals, from 
approximately 1100 AD to 1650 AD, there was only a semblance of a ‘national market.’ 
The Mughals were content with tax revenues and tributes that they received as a result of 
their power and therefore did not rely on the merchant classes.   The fragmentation and 
demise of the Mughal empire marked the advent and co-existence of dozens of smaller   3
principalities, each of whom came to rely on local merchants and local financiers to 
sustain their princely states.  Thus were created the nuclei of several prominent family 
businesses.  
The British empire gradually filled the void left by the Mughals. And British 
merchants set up trading businesses in India after the East India Company lost its 
monopoly on trade with India, giving rise to the creation of several large trading houses.   
Table 1 offers a birds-eye view of the different factors underlying the emergence 
of family based business groups over the past century. We list representative business 
groups that arose in each of four different time periods (though the Tata and Birla groups 
predate 1900), as well as a generic factor that described the rise of that type of group at 
that time.  
By the early 1900s, in addition to the British trading houses, a number of  
indigenous business groups had come into prominence.  Whether this happened in an 
atmosphere inimical to the rise of indigenous enterprise (Swamy, 1979), indifferent to it 
(Das, 2000, Chapter 5), or supportive of it (Ferguson, 2002) is a matter of continuing 
controversy.  
Subsequently, the Indian economy underwent several phases of major structural 
changes after India achieved independence from Britain in 1947.  In the first phase, in the 
1950s, the assets controlled by the British trading houses were transferred to Indian 
owners. In the second phase, from the late 1950s through the 1970s, the Indian 
government intervened in the economy through a variety of measures, which collectively 
came to be known as the “Licence Raj.”   Finally, there was an economic reform era, 
which began with small steps of deregulation in the 1980s, and picked up speed in the 
1990s following a major economic crisis in 1991. 
  The next two subsections show that concentrated ownership persisted in India 
over several decades but that the identity of the concentrated owners changed over time 
quite drastically. 
 
The Persistence of Concentrated Ownership 
Remarkably, while the economy was governed by these significantly different 
regimes over time, family business groups continued to dominate the Indian corporate   4
landscape.  Table 2  shows comparative statistics on the Indian state owned companies 
(SOEs) (or public sector companies) and exchange listed private sector companies , and 
multinational companies (MNCs) operating in India, as of 1993.
2   The ratio of number of 
traded private sector companies to state owned companies was approximately 17 to 1.  
Thus, there were far more traded private sector companies than public sector companies.  
However, public sector companies were on average significantly larger than traded 
private sector companies.  Revenues of all traded private sector companies was only 1.5 
times the revenues of state owned companies; similarly, assets of traded private sector 
companies were only 1.2 times the assets held by the public sector companies.   More 
strikingly, the total amount of equity capital in traded private sector companies was only 
0.51 times the equity in public sector companies.  Thus, private sector companies, while 
large in number, were more fragmented and relied on far less equity investment, relative 
to the public sector companies. 
  Table 2 also compares the traded Indian private sector companies with 
multinational companies operating in India as of 1993.  For each MNC operating in India, 
there were approximately 17 exchange listed private sector companies.   Domestic private 
companies we 4.3 times larger than MNCs in sales, and 9 times in terms of assets, 6.7 
times in terms of equity.  Thus MNCs played a relatively minor role in the Indian 
corporate sector as of 1993.   
  Within the indigenous private sector, a distinction should be drawn between 
group-affiliated companies and unaffiliated companies. The term group deserves 
discussion. Hazari (1966) in a classic study of Indian business groups, defined a group as 
the ‘area over which a decision-making authority holds sway’ (1966: page 7). The 
decision-making authority in question was almost always a family, though it could be a 
close-knit ethnic community as well. The area of control in effect was almost always a 
very diversified range of businesses.  He started his work by saying that it was ‘based on 
the proposition that the business group, not the individual joint stock company, is the unit 
of decision and, therefore, of economic power.’ (1966: preface). Earlier work concurred. 
For example, another influential study opined that the study of concentration of economy 
power is ‘unreal if divorced from a study of communities’ (Gadgil, 1951, p 29; the 
                                                 
2 Date drawn from Khanna (1997).   5
reference is to ethnic communities).
3  Hazari’s study provided an influential evaluation of 
the extent to which business groups had exercised monopoly power (he concluded that 
they had). Subsequent regulators and policymakers (e.g. Dutt, 1969) built on this work to 
demonstrate that the control that Hazari used as the defining feature of groups was often 
exercised through non-equity channels, e.g. through family ties or through manipulation 
of the boards of directors. 
In 1993, there were a total of 1113 group companies that were publicly listed on 
one of India’s several stock exchanges.  Post-independent India also gave birth to a large 
number of new companies that went on to become publicly listed on the countries’ stock 
exchanges.   In 1993, there were 1539 publicly listed non-group companies.  These 
companies were in part a result of government’s policy of restricting existing companies 
from expanding capacity.  Promoters of these companies were also able to launch these 
businesses with relatively small amount of own equity, thanks to the access to capital 
from state-owned financial institutions, and public capital markets.   
Table 3 compares group and non-group companies listed on Bombay stock 
exchange (BSE) as of 1993.
4  The sample consists of 567 group firms and 437 non-group 
firms for which the necessary data was available.  The group affiliates are members of 
252 different groups.  Ninety five percent of the groups have five or fewer affiliates 
traded on the BSE and the largest group (the Tata group) has twenty one affiliated 
companies traded on the BSE.  The mean (median) sales of group affilates is 1,411 (666) 
million Indian rupees.  This is significantly larger than the mean (median) sales of 
unaffiliated firms, which is 366 (217) million rupees.  The mean (median) age of group 
firms, which is 28.3 (22) years, is also significantly larger than mean (median) age of 
unaffiliated firms.   The mean (median) Tobin’s q for group firms was 1.39 (1.14), 
insignificantly different from the mean (median) value of 1.37 (1.06) for the non-group 
firms.   
                                                 
3 In recent work, Khanna and Rivkin (2002) have demonstrated econometrically that business groups in 
Chile can, at best, be identified only partially on the basis of equity interlocks. Director ties and common 
owner ties play an important role in delineating what Chileans (regulators and participants in financial 
markets) deem to meaningfully be part of a business group. Thus control is exercised, de facto, in ways 
very similar to India. 
4 These data are from Khanna and Palepu (2000)   6
The total sample has the following mean (median) ownership structure: foreign 
institutions, 8.9 (1.6) percent; domestic institutions, 13.9  (10.2) percent; insiders 27.1 
percent (26.5 percent); directors, 9.4 percent (3.4 percent); top fifty owners excluding the 
above categories, 6.21 (4.0) percent.  The remainder is held by dispersed shareholders.  
Relative to unaffiliated firms, group firms, on average, have significantly higher 
percentages of foreign and domestic institutional ownership, and higher insider 
ownership.  
In summary, the Indian corporate sector as of early 1990s had the following 
profile:  A little more than a hundred relatively large state owned enterprises and more 
than 2500 smaller publicly traded private sector companies, roughly equally split between 
group affiliated and non-group companies.  In the private sector, companies affiliated 
with business groups, with concentrated family ownership, accounted for a substantial 
proportion of assets. 
 
The Lack of Persistence of the Identity of Concentrated Owners 
While there has been a significant persistence in the phenomenon of concentrated 
family ownership in India over much of the 20
th century, there was less persistence in the 
actual composition of the top business groups themselves.  The Tata group remained the 
largest Indian group during the entire 60 year period on which we present data below.  
But other leading groups from the pre-Independence era (e.g. British groups such as 
Martin Burn, Andrew Yule, Inchcape) did not persist in their then-form.  Several new 
business houses rose to prominence during this period, including the Thapar group in the 
1950s and 1960s, the Ambani group in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Wipro and Munjal 
groups in the 1980s and 19990s.     Thus, the history of modern Indian corporate sector is 
characterized by both a persistence of concentrated ownership at the aggregate level, and 
a significant lack of persistence of dominance at the individual business group level.   
To demonstrate this more formally, we analyzed the persistence of dominance for 
Indian business groups over the past 60 years. This is based on size rankings (assets) for 
the fifty largest business groups compiled by Dr. Gita Piramal of Mumbai, India, for the 
years 1939, 1969, and 1999 (Table 4).   Her rankings have themselves been compiled 
from miscellaneous historical sources, including, but not limited to, various government   7
reports commissioned by the Government of India at various points in time.   Note that 
the rankings are not of firms, but of groups. That is, all firms controlled by a single entity, 
typically a family, are treated as a single economic unit.  As a benchmark against which 
to compare our analysis of the persistence of Indian groups, we also amass market value-
based rankings of the 50 largest U.S. firms at identical time periods. These data are 
compiled from Compustat and are in Table 5.  
Consult Table 4 for some summary statistics. Our first observation is that the 
Indian data show considerable turnover in ranks.  32 out of 50 of the top groups in 1969 
were not in the top 50 list in 1939. 43 of the top groups in 1999 were not in the top 50 list 
in 1969.  This flux in the list of largest entities is greater than that in the U.S. in 
comparable time periods where 28 and 37 firms enter the top 50 U.S. list in 1969 and 
1999 respectively. The comparison is all the more dramatic because the Indian data 
measures groups, which are collections of firms, while the U.S. data measures firms. (In 
other words, individual firms within Indian groups almost certainly would have greater 
turnover than that suggested by the data on groups.) 
Of the 18 groups that remain in the top 50 list in the 1939-1969 period (50 less 
32), 16 change ranks while only 2 have ranks that remain unchanged.  Further, 10 of the 
18 groups whose ranks change do so dramatically (that is, by more than 10 ranks in either 
direction).  In contrast, a smaller proportion of the firms whose ranks change in the U.S. 
top-50 list in 1939-1969 do so dramatically (5 out of 22). The proportion of radical rank 
changers is also higher in India during the 1969-1999 period (3 out of 7) than in the U.S. 
in the same period (5 out of 13).  
Note also that the turnover in the ranks of Indian groups is greater in the second 
30-year window than in the first.  This is important because part of the turnover in the 
1939-1969 period was due to transfer of assets from British ownership to Indian 
ownership at the end of the British colonial rule of India.  The turnover in the 1969-1999 
period reflects less unusual circumstances. 
Finally, an analysis of the groups or firms that are born in any period suggests that 
they do not generally leapfrog to the top of the rankings, nor do the top groups or firms in 
any period dramatically fall off the rankings. A regression of ranks on ‘births’ and on a 
variable that measures whether the group or firm is going to ‘die’ (that is, exit the top   8
rankings) the following period reveals positive and significant coefficients on both 
variables. That is, firms born in a particular period have higher ranks (are smaller) and 
firms that are about to die in the next period have higher ranks (are smaller). The 
regression reveals point estimates that are quite similar for both the Indian top50 group 
and U.S. top50 firm rankings, hinting at some underlying similarity in the competitive 
processes underlying such turnover. 
   The above pattern of corporate ownership in India is inconsistent with a pure 
corporate ownership entrenchment story.  We will turn, in each of the next two sections, 
to considering two potential explanations for concentrated ownership in an emerging 
economy like India (Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; Khanna, 2000). The first explanation 
has to do with rent-seeking behavior by prominent business families with strong political 
connections.  Under this hypothesis, business families control business groups to extract 
personal gains, and attain their position through directly unproductive economic activities 
and through their influence over government policies and actions.  The second hypothesis 
is that family business groups arise as a result of their entrepreneurial activity which is in 
short supply in emerging economies such as India with significant market failures and 
institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 1999, 2000a,b). 
 
III Political Connections and Rent Seeking Behavior 
 
In this section, we first describe how business government relationships evolved 
over the relevant timeframe for this paper, and then consider particular groups’ 
relationships with the government, with a view to uncovering whether or not there is 
systematic evidence to support the political connections story for persistence of 
concentrated ownership. 
 
Shifting Contours of Business Government Relations   
A close relationship between business and government had existed for quite some 
time in India.  During the British colonial rule, the interest of British companies was 
naturally favored over the interest of Indian business houses (Piramal, 1998; pp. 162, 
230).  As the movement for freedom from the British Raj gathered momentum in the   9
1920s and 1930s, close relationships developed between Indian businesses and leaders of 
the political movement for India’s independence.  Underscoring their symbiotic 
relationship in a letter, as he was building steam for India’s independence movement in 
1927,  Mohandas Gandhi  told G.D. Birla, a prominent Indian businessman, “I am ever 
hungry for money” (Cited in Piramal, 1991).     
The pragmatic collaboration between the new Indian government and the business 
community to build modern India continued in the immediate aftermath of independence 
(1947 to 1960).  For example, Hindalco and Telco collaborated with the Government of 
India to set up Hindustan Aeronautics Limited to develop the aviation sector in India.  
However, the relationship soured in the 1960s as Indian government, under the leadership 
of Prime Minister Jawarharlal Nehru, moved the country’s economic policies towards 
socialism.  This period, often characterized as the License Raj, began with the 
government’s desire to curb big business houses, and to directly intervene in economic 
activities through public sector corporations.   
Several prominent government commissions, including the Mahalanobis 
Committee of 1964, Monopolies Inquiry Commission of 1965, R. K. Hazari Committee 
of 1966, and the Industrial Licensing Policy Committee of 1969, were established during 
this period.  These commissions documented evidence that big business houses were 
exerting significant influence on Indian economy, and that they were exploiting growth 
opportunities through favorable access to finance and government permits.  These 
commissions were followed by the creation of Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act (MRTP) and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), and the 
nationalization of the largest private sector banks.  These policy changes, spearheaded by 
the government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, imposed strict government controls on 
private sector’s ability to pursue growth opportunities, access domestic finance, or 
collaborate with foreign technology or business partners.   The FERA act also required 
that multinational companies operating in India divest their ownership so that a majority 
of the ownership in the Indian operations was held by Indian shareholders.   
In the mid-1980s, under the government of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, a 
gradual move towards deregulation began.  These reforms relaxed some of the MRTP 
and import restrictions, and freed up some of the economy from licensing requirements.    10
Despite these changes, the Indian economy grew at a fairly modest rate during this entire 
period, culminating in a foreign exchange payment crisis in the early 1990s.  This crisis 
led to a dramatic deregulation and liberalization of the Indian economy.  Under the 
Congress Party government of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, and then subsequently 
under the BJP government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, the MRTP and 
FERA Acts were repealed, several sectors of the economy including telecom, commercial 
aviation, and banking -  previously reserved for the public sector - were opened to private 
sector, and import duties were dramatically reduced.    
 
Business Groups and Government 
As the contours of business-government relations shifted in India during the past 
half century, there were complex shifts in relationships between individual business 
groups and the government in power. Different groups occupied different positions of 
favoritism at different times.  There is evidence that these political connections played an 
important role in the rise and fall of different business houses.   But it is interesting that 
the groups that remained dominant throughout did so despite ebbs and flows in their 
relationship with the government. Clearly proximity to government was not the only 
cause of their success. 
Consider the House of Tata.  JRD Tata, in the pre-independence period, presided 
over a group that was, in fact, quite reliant on government contracts.  Before World War 
I, Tata Steel would not have started without a guarantee from the British government for 
Indian Railways, nor would Tata Steel have grown to the largest integrated steel factory 
in the British Commonwealth without such government contracts. And Tata Steel was 
protected by tariffs against German and Japanese, if not British, steel (Hazari, 1986).  The 
Tatas adopted a neutral stance in the Independence movement.  As Piramal (1998; p. 481) 
puts it, in the British Raj, the Tata Group ‘bristled’ with knights.  
But by 1960, the group remained India’s largest even though it had fallen out of 
favor, as it was opposed to the socialist philosophy of Prime Minister Nehru.  Reacting to 
the various government commissions suggesting that large business houses manipulated 
and abused the licensing system, JRD Tata is reported to have cynically said, “Yesterday 
in Parliament, they called me a monopolist with ‘great concentration of power.’ I wake   11
up every morning and I am supposed to say, ‘ I have great concentration of power. Whom 
shall I crush today? A competitor or a worker in my factory or the consumer?’ .... No 
dear boy I am powerless .. I cannot decide how much to borrow, what shares to issue, at 
what price, what wages or bonus to pay, and what dividend to give. I even need the 
government’s permission for the salary I pay to a senior executive” (quoted in Das, 2000; 
pp 168-169). Indeed, far from manipulating the licensing system to its advantage, the 
Tata group reportedly made 119 new proposals for expansions in (existing or de novo) 
businesses between 1960 and 1989 and every one of them was rejected (Das, 2000; p. 
93). Further, some of the Tata’s assets were nationalized, most famously Tata’s airline. 
And JRD Tata contributed to the Swatantara Party’s coffers, to create an alternative to 
Nehru’s Congress since the former stood for less regulation than that espoused by the 
latter. 
Turn to the Birla’s next. Under G.D. Birla, the group supported the Independence 
movement financially. Sarojini Naidu, herself a prominent figure in the India of that era, 
famously said ‘it took all Birla’s millions to enable Gandhi to live in poverty. And he 
gave for free’ (Piramal, 1998).  The group rose to prominence in the post-independence 
period, and by 1969 became the second largest Indian business group.  However, under 
the government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Birla group became the target of 
criticism for its manipulation of the licensing system, as it was targeted by the Hazari 
reports and criticized for preempting licenses – that is, for applying for licenses which it 
then failed to use. Indeed G. D. Birla’s successor, Aditya Birla, was allegedly sufficiently 
disappointed by being, in his view, unfairly tarnished by the government’s allegations, 
that he simply shifted his expansion plans overseas. So much so that, between 1970 and 
1995, the Birla’s had established plants in Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand, with overseas activity accounting for a  third of their overall business, and 
the world’s leading position in viscose staple fiber, palm oil and insulators, and the 
world’s sixth largest position in the manufacture of carbon black (Das 2000, pp 176). The 
implication is that the size and prominence of the group is due to the Birla’s 
entrepreneurial tendencies finding expression around the licensing restrictions at least in 
part, rather than by embracing them and engaging purely in rent-seeking activities.    12
All this is not to deny that rent-seeking existed. Clearly there were abuses in the 
system, far too many indicators are consistent with this. See recently Bertrand, et al. 
(2002), for example, and our own earlier work (Khanna, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 
2000c) on the dark side of business groups.
5 But it is a mistake to tar the entire corporate 
sector with the same broad brush.  As the caselets above suggest, some of the groups 
remained dominant despite sustained periods of falling out of favor. Others directed their 
energies to expansion outside India rather than manipulating the licensing system.  
Further, note the following possibility of possibly misplaced emphasis and 
incorrect inference.  We do not contest that the license raj was bad for economic 
development. As Hazari (1986; pp. xxiv) put it, ‘the abuses and failures are no longer, as 
the Italians say, mere apertura; they are wide-open doors.’  But whether concentrated 
ownership was the cause of this miasma is less clear. The ‘Kafkaesque maze of controls’ 
(Bhagwati, 1993)  had more to do with a heady fascination with the intellectual cuisine of 
the London School of Economics and Cambridge (Hazari, 1986), and the wonder of the 
then ascendant Soviet planning machine, than with the actions of India’s dominant family 
businesses. Business groups had to either manipulate it, as some did, or invent themselves 
around it, as did others.  
 
IV  Entrepreneurship in the context of institutional voids 
 
In an emerging economy, many institutions necessary for the functioning of 
product markets, labor markets, and financial markets are typically missing or 
underdeveloped.  In India, this was certainly true under colonial rule.  Indeed, the heavy 
state intervention in the economy in the first few decades of independence was justified 
by successive governments as a way to deal with these market failures.  
As Khanna and Palepu (1997, 1999, 2000a,b) and others (Leff, 1976, 1978, 
Strachan, 1976) argue, business groups could be seen as a private sector response to the 
institutional voids in the economy.  Groups often perform functions traditionally 
performed by market institutions in more mature markets.  One such important function 
                                                 
5 De Long (2001) suggests, based on an analysis of growth rates of several countries, that the effects of the 
License Raj might have been overstated (or, at least, the negative effects were offset by other positive 
factors).   13
is the provision of something akin to venture capital, consisting of identifying promising 
new business opportunities in the economy and  exploiting them with in-house risk 
capital and managerial talent, which are traditionally in short-supply in the economy at 
large. This, in turn, leads to the observed predominance of the business group type of 
organizational form in emerging economies.   
It is important to note that this hypothesis only implies that economies such as 
India will have a preponderance of business group type organizations.  It does not 
necessarily imply that the same set of business groups will continue to be prominent in 
the economy over time.  This continued success of a business group under this 
explanation depends on its ability to sustain its entrepreneurial nature over a long period 
of time.  While some groups may succeed in this endeavor, others may fail.  In this sense, 
the rise and fall of business groups over time in emerging economies is akin to the rise 
and fall of businesses in advanced economies.  
   The history of the Tata group provides a classic example of how some Indian 
business groups pursued new business opportunities successfully over time.  Figure 1 
shows the time line of the entry of the Tata group into various new businesses, from 1870 
to 2001 -  textiles in 1874, hospitality industry in 1902, steel in 1907, power in 1910, 
cement in 1912, soaps and toiletries in 1917, printing and publishing in 1931, aviation in 
1932, chemicals in 1939, consumer electronics in 1940, commercial vehicles & 
locomotives in 1945, cosmetics in 1952, air-conditioning in 1954, pharmaceuticals in 
1958, tea and coffee in 1962, information technology in 1968 (see Section VI), watches, 
financial services in 1984, auto components in 1993, telecom services in 1994, passenger 
cars in 1998, retail in 1999,  and insurance in 2001.  Despite the remarkable diversity of 
these businesses, the group has been able to maintain a leading position in many, if not 
most, of the businesses it entered over time.  It only had to exit a small handful of 
businesses in its history – aviation in 1953 (due to government nationalization), 
locomotives in 1970, soaps and toiletries in 1993, cosmetics and pharmaceuticals in 
1998, cement in 2000, textiles in 2001, and printing and publishing in 2003.
6 
                                                 
6 There appears to have been a short-lived and aborted entry into shipping in the late 1890s. This effort, 
along with those of a number of other Indian entrepreneurs until the establishment of Walhand Hirachand’s 
Scindia shipping company, foundered when faced with the British-controlled shipping ‘conference’ 
controlled by Inchcape and others.   14
  The role played by the Tata’s is exactly to fill the institutional void of venture 
capital in these instances, as well as to provide an exit mechanism to aspiring 
entrepreneurs in the absence of well-functioning public markets. For example, Tata 
Chemicals supported its engineers’ efforts to innovate. In some instances, these engineers 
left to start up their own companies, and the Tata’s had been known to buy out the results 
of these efforts subsequently (see example in Piramal, 1998; p. 473). 
It is interesting that this process of entrepreneurship is often criticized in the 
media as being undisciplined and characterized by a failure to adhere to core 
competencies. This reflects a mistaken notion of what constitutes the ‘core competence’ 
(Selznick) as it were. Here it is at least as much an ability to circumvent institutional 
voids as it is some industry-specific knowledge. As N. A. Soonawala, a board member of 
Tata Sons, the main holding company of the Tata’s, said to us in 1998 in response to 
criticisms by leading multinational consulting firms at the time, “If everyone is told not to 
go into unrelated businesses, how will the airlines, oil, and telecommunications industries 
develop? The government has said that they can’t do it. So there’s a social benefit to all 
this diversification” (Khanna, Palepu, and Wu, 1998). 
  An important feature of entrepreneurship in India is the reliance on the ethnic 
group, to supplement family networks (Lamb 1976).  The Marwari, Gujerati and Parsi 
communities are, by far, the dominant business communities in India in recent decades, 
and even today.  For example, these communities collectively controlled 62 of the 100 
largest companies in 1989 (Piramal, 1989).  Other active communities include the 
Punjabis, Chettiars and the Maharashtrians.  
  These communities share their distinctive tenors.  For example, Gujeratis were 
traditionally traders with countries in the Middle East and East Africa.  Parsis, from the 
small minority Zoroastrian community in India, were most “Westernized” in their 
business outlook, and traditionally played the role of intermediaries with Europe.  
Marwaris, a demographically small segment originally from the state of Rajasthan in 
western India, have been the most geographically spread business community, pursuing 
businesses all over the country. By 2000, Das (p 174) quotes an estimate that says that the 
Marwaris controlled half the industrial assets of India.    15
  Tinberg (1978) chronicled the modus operandi of Marwari businesses. 
Traditionally, the great Marwari firms had networks spreading all over Asia and deep into 
China. They relied on their own kin for information and for effective contractual 
enforcement. In our terminology, these ethnic networks were substitutes for institutional 
voids, and shared features with the networks used by the Genoese and Maghribi traders 
studied by Greif (1994) and by the Rothschilds.  Famously, Marwaris’ simple and 
rigorous, if manual, cost accounting systems provided a cost-effective means of financing 
that allowed them to stomach risks in a time of capital scarcity.  
In pre-British and British India, the history of prominent business groups is 
characterized by the willingness of the successful members of each ethnic community to 
help spawn new members, some times even to compete with their existing businesses.  
For example, several prominent Marwari groups in existence today are spun off from the 
Birla group.  Birlas have been known to actively encourage talented employees to pursue 
their own business opportunities, and sometimes even finance these new ventures. 
Several groups spun off the Birla group (e.g. Khaitan, Kejriwal, to cite just a couple) and 
continue to exist today (Piramal, 1998; p. 142-43).   Kasturbhai Lalbhai, a prominent 
textile businessman, helped his ethnic group members with the technology of setting up 
textile mills.  Walchand Hirachand Doshi actively promoted shipping companies, 
including direct competitors of his own, as part of the struggle against the British Raj 
(Piramal, 1998; p. 162, 230).  As Lamb puts it (1976), the acts of entrepreneurship in 
British India were heroic, especially in view of the powerful interests arrayed against the 
entrepreneurs.  
The entrepreneurship has continued in modern times and extends beyond 
expansion of product lines to institutional innovation. A good example is that of the 
Ambanis. A relatively recent entrant into the leading business groups, the flagship 
company, Reliance, is India’s only entry into the Global Fortune 500.  While many point 
to a close relationship with the government of Mrs. Indira Gandhi as being part of the 
reason for the company’s initial success – founder Dhirubhai Ambani famously said he 
would ‘salaam’ (salute) anyone to sell his ideas
7 – the fact remains that the group has 
developed world-class capabilities in managing large-scale capital intensive projects, and 
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is an innovative financier. Its most notable contribution to institutional innovation in 
India is perhaps the creation of an equity cult. As Das (2000, chapter 13) chronicles, 
Dhirubhai Ambani single-handedly mobilized small investors around the country in 1977 
and listed on the Bombay and Ahmedabad stock exchanges when the dominant public 
financial institutions would not lend him capital.  Between 1980 and 1985, the number of 
Indian shareholders went from 1 to 4 million, and fully 25% of these shareholders owned 
shares in Reliance, the Ambani company. 
To recapitulate, we have considered two classes of explanations – rent seeking 
behavior and entrepreneurial activity – to explain the dual phenomena of persistence of 
concentrated ownership, but turnover in the identity of the concentrated owners. Both 
explanations have circumstantial evidence in favor of them. Superficial attempts to 
attribute data to one or the other of these explanations should be met with disdain.  It is 
hard to believe, in particular, that rent-seeking can provide a full explanation, especially 
of the shifting identity of concentrated ownership. 
 
V  The recent evolution of groups and markets 
 
The evidence presented above is consistent with the idea that Indian business 
groups with family and community ties arose historically, in part, due to the absence of 
well-developed financial markets.  During the past three decades, financial markets in 
India have developed significantly, in part due to paradoxical consequences of policies 
aimed at other ends during the era of socialism, and in part due to direct attempts by the 
government aimed at market development during the more recent reform era.     
Under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act passed during the socialist era of the 
1960s and 1970s, multinationals operating in India were required to reduce their 
ownership to below 40%, and divest the rest to Indian investors.  To comply with this 
requirement, many multinationals offered their shares to public investors through public 
offerings on the Bombay Stock Exchange.  The issue prices were set by the Controller of 
Capital Issues, a government body, at book values which were often dramatically below 
economic values.  As a result, individual investors were able to buy shares at very 
attractive prices in very good companies.  These public offerings had a number of   17
spillover effects.  First, they created a culture of equity ownership in India on a large 
scale, because many retail investors were attracted to the opportunity of earning 
significant returns that were almost assured.  Second, the process of listing these 
companies on Bombay stock exchange resulted in the creation of an intermediation and 
market infrastructure – accounting and auditing professionals, financial analysts, 
investment bankers, and stock-brokers.   
When India began to liberalize its economy in the 1990s, one of the key 
objectives of the government policy was to attract foreign institutional investors.  To 
accomplish this, the government established the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI), modeled closely after the US Securities Exchange Commission.   Following the 
establishment of SEBI, a number of significant capital market reforms were put in place: 
new regulations strengthening corporate disclosure and governance standards, new 
regulations and enforcement mechanisms to ensure orderly and fair trading practices on 
the country’s stock exchanges, and opening the market to international financial 
intermediaries.   Companies were allowed to float shares at market prices, rather than at 
the artificially low prices dictated by the Controller of Capital Issues.  Finally, Indian 
companies were also allowed for the first time to list on international stock exchanges. 
All these changes resulted in significantly improved financial markets in India, and 
enhanced the ability of entrepreneurs and established businesses to access domestic and 
international equity capital.   
These changes, coupled with a significant deregulation of product markets, led to 
new opportunities and challenges for business groups.  A number of first generation 
entrepreneurs were able to tap into the capital markets to exploit new business 
opportunities.  Prominent among them was the Reliance Group, which raised vast sums 
of money on the Bombay Stock Exchange to finance its petrochemical ventures to 
become one of the largest enterprises in India.  Reliance went on to become a diversified 
business group when it began to exploit new business opportunities thrown open with the 
deregulation of power and telecommunication sectors.   This era also gave rise to a 
number prominent companies in the software and pharmaceutical sectors -  Infosys, 
Wipro, and Satyam Computer Services in software, and Ranbaxy and Dr. Reddy’s in 
pharmaceuticals.  Some these companies are family controlled but professionally   18
managed (Wipro, Satyam, Ranbaxy, and Dr. Reddy’s); some are diversified (Wipro 
operating in consumer products and information technology) while others are focused in 
one sector (Infosys, Satyam, Ranbaxy, and Dr. Reddy’s).   
While the development of capital markets and the deregulation and globalization 
of the Indian economy has given rise to the birth of these new entrepreneurial firms, some 
of the old family business groups also have adapted and grown during this era.  The most 
prominent among them is the Tata group which continues to be the largest business group 
in India.  The Tata group has been able to exploit many of the new business opportunities 
in software and telecom.  Today, TCS, one of the Tata group companies, is the country’s 
largest information technology services company, and Tata Telecom is one of the largest 
telecommunication companies in India.   
 
VI. The Indian Software Industry 
 
(a) Why study the software industry? 
The software services industry provides a lower bound on the relative advantage 
of family business groups over independent entrepreneurs in exploiting new opportunities 
for a number of reasons.  First, the industry was very conducive to de novo entry because 
of low capital requirements, little government regulation on entry, and a relatively low 
level of minimum economic scale to achieve profitability.  Further, the Indian 
government invested in elite technical institutions, such as the Indian Institutes of 
Technology and Indian Institutes of Management, and a large number of other 
engineering colleges.  These institutions produced abundant talent, a critical input for the 
software services industry.    Graduates of these institutions, relying on a recognized 
education brand, were more willing to work for de novo startups than for incumbent 
business groups.   Finally, government policies restricting operations of multinationals 
such as IBM left plenty of opportunities for domestic entrepreneurs.   Given all these 
factors, software services is one industry where individual entrepreneurs could compete 
effectively with established family business houses of India.  Further, business houses 
could not rely on any ability they might have had to exercise regulatory muscle, since 
there were no regulations to muscle into. Thus, the history of software industry, and the   19
role of business groups in this industry, provide further evidence on why business groups 
play such an important role in India even today.    
 
(b) Origins of the Indian Software Industry  
  Until the mid-1960s, there was virtually no software development going in India.  
Whatever software sold was bundled with computers sold by multinational companies 
like IBM.  The early software development efforts focused on producing in-house 
applications for efficient use of these computers.  Government policies attempted to 
encourage the growth of a domestic hardware industry through high import tariffs on 
hardware.  State owned hardware companies, such as the Electronic Corporation of India 
Limited, attempted to produce computers for domestic academic and commercial use, 
and these efforts included development of operating systems, compilers and application 
packages.  Most of these efforts, however, were not very successful.    
Of course, many of the reasons to which modern observers attribute the success of 
today’s Indian software industry – e.g. low cost talent, English language, and a tradition 
of entrepreneurship – did in fact exist prior to the 1960s.  The fact that the industry did 
not, however, and the fact that the industry continues not to have made a mark in other 
low-cost, English speaking countries suggests that these are certainly not sufficient 
conditions for the success of the Indian software industry. 
It is instructive that the industry really got its start with the establishment in 1968 
of Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tata Sons, itself the 
holding company of the Tata Group, a diversified business group and the epitome of 
concentrated ownership. As per Heeks (1996), TCS was the first commercial 
organization to subscribe to the export-commitment related terms under which the Indian 
government allowed the import of hardware. Tata’s ostensible purpose was to allow its 
diverse companies to use computers in their operations.  Toward this end, the company 
formed an alliance with Burroughs Corporation.  Under this alliance, Burroughs would 
help secure US clients for TCS; in return, TCS would act as an exclusive sales agent for 
Burroughs hardware in India.  Based on this alliance, TCS secured its first U.S. client – 
the Detroit Police Department.  TCS today is the largest software services company in   20
India employing more than 19,000 software engineers.  The company is privately held, 
fully owned by Tata Sons Limited, the apex of the Tata group companies.   
  But it was a serendipitous event that triggered the rise of TCS, having to do with 
the withdrawal of the ‘incumbent,’ IBM, in 1978.  IBM took this step in response to the 
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) of India, which limited multinational 
companies (MNCs) to a maximum of 40% ownership stake in their Indian subsidiaries, 
and specified policies for access to foreign exchange for imports, and the use of foreign 
exchange earned through exports.   MNCs had to either choose between reducing their 
stake to this level by selling their shares to the Indian public, or leave the country.  
Several MNCs chose to dilute their stakes through public offerings on the Bombay stock 
exchange, but IBM and Coca Cola were two prominent exceptions.   The decision of 
IBM to leave India meant that 1200 employees of the company had to look for other 
alternatives to exploit their skills.  Many of these employees set up small software 
consulting companies which would offer software development and maintenance services 
to former IBM customers, leading to the beginnings of the Indian software industry.  The 
departure of IBM also allowed many smaller hardware companies to expand into India, 
exposing Indian software programmers to a variety of software platforms. 
  Other unintended consequences of Indian government policy also played a role in 
shaping the nascent industry. For example, the severe import restrictions on hardware – 
requirements of government permits, high customs duties, and control of foreign 
currency availability – gave a fillip to the industry practice that received the derogatory 
title of  ‘bodyshopping,’ whereby programmers were shipped off to the client site and 
worked on the client’s computers.  This in turn led to some companies building 
relationships with their clients that were then to play a major role in shaping the industry. 
  The outward-looking nature of the industry from the outset was also influenced by 
the unattractiveness of the domestic market. This, in turn, had several causes.   First, 
fearing unemployment from automation, the government did not encourage the adoption 
of computerization in government and state-owned enterprises.  Second, its interest in 
developing a domestic hardware industry led the government to impose extremely high 
tariffs (350 percent in much of the 1970s and early 1980s).  Third, Indian private sector 
companies had little incentive to adopt information technology to improve operations and   21
productivity, given the highly protected nature of the economy.  As a result, Indian 
software firms found it difficult to generate much demand for their services in the 
domestic market.  This outward orientation stood in significant contrast to the orientation 
of much of the Indian private sector, which was focused on the Indian domestic market 
rather than the export market. 
  More broadly than these specific serendipitous events, software slipped under the 
discerning bureaucrat’s otherwise omnipresent proverbial radar screen, so to speak.  The 
origin of India’s socialist policies and heavy-handed micromanagement of enterprise lay 
in Oxford & Cambridge-indoctrinated Fabian socialism which sought to regulate the 
‘commanding heights’ of the economy. But this required physical assets to control. 
Software, with its characteristic intangibles, was too ephemeral to be included in the 
purview of these regulations.   
  Other than the intangible nature of the assets in question in the software industry, 
another reason why the industry escaped some of the pernicious effects of Indian 
socialism had to do with its non-capital-intensive nature. The state’s stranglehold on the 
financial sector did not matter as much.  Several of the last decade’s changes have helped 
move an already existing industry along. For example, far-ranging deregulation initiated 
following an exchange-rate crisis in 1990 generically improved the outlook for business. 
The delicensing of hardware imports and the greatly falling hardware prices 
internationally meant that entry barriers into the Indian domestic software industry fell 
drastically. Software firms were allowed to set up private telecommunications networks 
to promote remote software services (often to clients in the west). The party in power 
until early 2004, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), was generally pro-business and the first 
to explicitly support the software industry in its election manifesto.  
But our general point is that these recent changes do not shed much light on the 
origins of the industry.  It is interesting to ask how a low-cost, talent-intensive 
environment could become a world-player in a knowledge-intensive industry.  Clearly 
serendipity, as opposed to explicit design, played a role. More interestingly for our 
purposes, concentrated ownership, in the garb of TCS, was the best positioned to 
capitalize on the opportunities revealed by serendipity.  Indeed, the ownership links 
among the Tata companies were among the ties that cemented them (along with director   22
interlocks, a shared if informal access to the Tata brand, and shared senior level talent), 
and permitted TCS to leverage the Tata Group’s reputation. It is doubtful that an entity 
could have arisen in a vacuum, unaffiliated with an existing reputable private sector 
entity, to capitalize on the software industry opportunity.  In a subsequent sub-section, we 
will show how TCS’s approach differed from that of other firms in India and that, not 
only did TCS not deter the entry of de novo aspirants, it actually facilitated entry. 
 
(c) The modern industrial organization of the Indian software industry 
Table 7 shows the distribution of the companies in the industry by revenues. 
Table 8 shows a list of top 20 companies and their revenues.  The top five firms in the 
industry, with sales greater than 10 billion Indian rupees, account for 32 percent of the 
total revenues of the industry.  These five firms are: Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), 
Infosys Technologies, Wipro Technologies, Satyam Computer Services, and HCL 
Technologies.  TCS, Wipro, and Satyam are affiliated with family owned business 
groups, which entered the software industry as part of a diversification move by their 
parent groups.  TCS is privately owned; Wipro is publicly traded, but approximately 84 
percent of the shares are held by the founder; Satyam is publicly traded, with only 11 
percent of the shares held by the founding family.  Infosys and HCL were started by 
computer professionals, and are publicly listed companies.  There are also several large 
Indian software companies that are affiliates of multinational companies.  These include 
Indian arms of overseas software services firms such as IBM Global Services.  Also, 
there are arms of multinational operating companies which use India as a base for their 
internal software development needs.  Examples include Siemens Information Systems 
Limited and Motorola.  Affiliates of multinational companies together account for 22 
percent of the industry’s total revenues.    There are 24 large software companies that are 
publicly traded on the Indian stock exchanges.
8  Three of these – Infosys, Satyam, and 
Wipro- are also listed on the U.S. stock exchanges.   
Compare  the industrial organization of the software industry to that of the Indian 
economy as a whole reported in Tables 2 & 3. The role of the private sector looms much 
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larger than that of the (absent) public sector in the software industry than it does in the 
economy at large.  There are large, dominant software firms that have emerged – 
separating the wheat from the chaff, as it were – and this has happened through the 
normal forces of global competition.  Three of the five most successful companies in the 
software industry – TCS, Wipro, and Satyam - were launched by business groups, and 
remain affiliated to these groups
9. Whereas absence of capital barriers to entry 
characterizes the industry, reputation, the forte of those groups that have succeeded, 
poses a formidable barrier to entry. Further, from the fact that multinationals have not 
been able to displace the domestic group companies, we can conjecture that the 
reputation of the former is probably based at least in part on some hard-to-replicate 
ability to run a software company in India. 
 
(d) The Success of the Indian Software Industry 
The case of the Indian software industry provides a contrasting picture to the 
received wisdom that primarily emphasizes the ills of concentrated ownership.
10  Here, 
we provide some broad data to support the claim that the software industry is, in fact, a 
success story despite the ubiquity of concentrated ownership. Why do we think of this as 
a success? In contrast to the lackluster performance of the Indian economy as a whole, 
the performance of the Indian software industry has been impressive.
11 
12   The industry’s 
                                                 
9 A fourth company, Infosys, has a very high level of insider ownership even though it is not affiliated with 
a business group.   
10 Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) used U.S. data to argue that the monitoring benefits of concentrated 
ownership declined beyond a certain threshold level of concentrated ownership.  A more recent literature 
on corporate governance around the world points to the exploitation of minority shareholders by controlling 
concentrated owners as being a prevalent problem (La Porta et al. 2000; Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002). 
Morck et al. 1998 have argued that concentrated ownership has resulted in the onset of ‘Canadian disease’ 
which they associate with slower growth, lower innovation and other forms of non-competitive malaise. 
11 This history relies on the following sources: Delong and Nanda (2002), Heeks (1996), Ghemawat (2002), 
NASSCOM (2002, 2003), Kennedy (2001), and Kummerle (2003). 
12 Some aggregate performance indices for the country are worth keeping in mind to interpret the software 
industry numbers. At the macro level, India’s overall economic performance during the post-independence 
years can only be characterized as relatively poor.  For example, the United Nation’s Human Development 
Report of 2002 ranks India 124 among the 173 countries.   According to the statistics reported by the 
Planning Commission of the Government of India, the country’s GNP grew at annual average rate of 
approximately 4 percent between 1951 and 1990.  This rate increased to approximately 6 percent in the 
post-reform years of 1990 to 2002. India’s population has grown significantly to 1.05 billion by 2002. 
While government spending on public education was more around 3 percent of GNP, a disproportionate 
amount of this went to supporting higher education.  According to the Indian government’s 2001 Census of 
India, adult illiteracy rate stood at 34.6 percent in 2001.   Agriculture still remained the dominant source of   24
total revenues in 2002 stood at $10.2 billion, and it grew at more than 40% per year 
during the 1990s.  The industry accounted for $7.7 billion in exports in 2002, which was 
a significant portion of the approximately $73.3  billion total exports of goods and 
services from India in that year.
13  One indication of technical prowess is that five of the 
nine software development centers in the world with CMM Level 5 ratings, the highest 
ratings on the predominant quality scale developed for software at Carnegie-Mellon 
University, were located in India.  Companies like General Electric, Citicorp and IBM 
had their only CMM-certified operations in India rather than in the U.S.
14 According to a 
report prepared by the international consulting firm McKinsey for the National 
Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), an industry trade 
association, the industry is expected to grow to $77 billion by 2008, accounting for 7 
percent of India’s GDP, 33 percent of its foreign exchange inflows, and 4 million jobs.  
By all these measures, software industry is the crown jewel of India’s post-independence 
economy. 
While this establishes that the Indian software industry has done well relative to 
any sensible domestic benchmark, two other benchmarks are worth considering. 
Consider, first, comparisons with U.S. software companies, and then, comparisons of the 
Indian industry with itself, as it were, over time. 
  Table 9 compares the largest Indian software companies with the some of the 
largest U.S. software companies in terms of revenues, employees, profitability, and 
market capitalization, all as of 2002.    Indian companies are clearly not as large as some 
of the largest US software firms such as CSC, Accenture, and EDS in terms of revenues 
or manpoer.  However, in terms of profitability, Indian firms are significantly better than 
                                                                                                                                                 
income for a very significant portion of the population, and there were significant levels of unemployment 
and underemployment.  Per capita GNP in 2001 stood at approximately $450 dollars.  A caveat to this 
interpretation is that, in the two decades leading to 2000, India’s cumulative average growth rate was 
second only to China’s in this time period.  Our reading is that it was a good performance, but not stellar 
enough to alleviate the suffering of the Indian masses. In a recent analysis, De Long (2001) argues that 
India was in the middle of the pack of countries that he analyzes over longer time periods. 
 
14 It may be that quality concerns are greater when a firm is located in an environment with a reputation for 
poor governance and poor quality products. Perhaps U.S. firms do not find it necessary to seek certification 
of this sort.   25
their US counterparts.  The stock market valuations of Indian companies, despite their 
smaller size, are often larger than the market capital of the US firms.
15     
  Consider, now, the industry’s evolution over time. Table 10 shows the time-series 
of the total activity of the Indian software industry from 1988 to 2002.  The industry had 
a total revenue of 0.7 billion Indian rupees in 1988,  and the proportion of exports to 
domestic sales was 41 percent.  By 2002, the industry grew to a size of 365 billion 
rupees, with exports accounting for 76 percent.  This is driven by the rising importance of 
offshore services (from 51% of export revenues in 2002 from 5% in1991), the value-
added part of the Indian software firms’ offerings. This, in turn, is a reflection of 
gradually developed reputations for reliability and high quality of services, starting from 
a base of primarily bodyshopping (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000).  By 2000, the U.S. 
accounted for 66% of the total exports of the industry and UK accounted for the second 
largest share of exports, at 14%.  185 of the Fortune 500 US companies were customers 
of the Indian software services industry. 
  This smorgasbord of data leaves us relatively convinced that, despite the ubiquity 
of concentrated ownership, it is hard to tell a story of a sclerotic industry, engulfed with 
rent-seeking behavior and in its death throes. Quite the contrary. It is also instructive to 
note that direct measures of corporate governance, which we turn to below, also do not 
yield predictions consistent with the predicted dismal effects of concentrated ownership.  
The Indian software industry, on average, appears to follow better corporate 
governance practices relative to the rest of the Indian industry, consistent with the 
hypothesis that globalization puts pressure on companies to improve their governance to 
global standards.  Some data from Credit Lyonnais Securities Analysis (CLSA, 2001) 
supports this assessment of the current state of Indian corporate governance. The data are 
from a set of questions regarding corporate governance administered to 482 companies in 
24 emerging markets in 2001. The companies are generally the ones of greater interest to 
foreign investors, typically characterized by some subset of the following characteristics 
– large size, greater equity float, and foreign listings.  When we ranked countries by the 
mean corporate governance score constructed by CLSA, we found that India ranked in 
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high of $90 bn and then, following the NASDAQ crash and its ripple effect in India, settled at $55 bn by 
mid-2000.     26
about the middle.  Since most countries in these data have poor average corporate 
governance (with some exceptions like Hong Kong and Singapore), and since the 
selected companies are generally the better governed ones, this confirms the 
characterization offered above. 
  The same CLSA data, however, also point out that the corporate governance 
ratings of the software firms are higher than those of other Indian firms. The mean ratings 
for software firms (of which there are eight in the CLSA data) and for non-software firms 
(of which there are 72) are, respectively, 64.3 and 54.7 (minimum of 0 and maximum of 
100), with the difference statistically significantly with a p-value of 0.02. The medians 
are, similarly, 62.9 and 53.8, with the difference statistically significant with a p-value of 
0.2. 
  The data also confirm that software firms are, on average, more exposed to global 
competition than other Indian firms. To ratify this assertion, we supplemented CLSA data 
with a variety of indicators of global competition. Software firms are more likely to be 
traded on a U.S. stock exchange (p value 0.02) and on the London Stock Exchange (p-
value 0.08) and more likely to be listed on the NYSE (p value 0.01).  Software firms 
garner a higher percentage of their revenues through exports (p value 0.01), are more 
likely to employ foreign talent in senior managerial positions (p value 0.01) and are 
somewhat more likely to employ a Big 5 accounting firm (p value 0.12).
16 
  Finally, having established that the Indian software industry outperforms domestic 
benchmarks (in terms of profitability, market capitalization, and corporate governance), 
outperforms U.S. benchmarks, and is improving over time, consider some evidence that, 
while least precise, is perhaps farthest reaching.  The social transformation brought about 
by the rise of the software industry is difficult to exaggerate. Most compellingly, Indian 
talent have role models of entrepreneurship – from both de novo bootstrapped firms and 
from business group offshoots – to spur them forward (Khanna and Palepu, 2004).  
Individuals, in rural and urban settings, are much closer to having the information they 
need to be ‘empowered’ (Das, 2000).  Indeed, rural India is being transformed by the 
roadside availability of computing power (in much the same way that a previous 
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dissemination of franchised telephone kiosk services around the country revolutionized 
telecommunication service provision).  It is thus difficult to escape the conclusion that the 
positive spillovers from the Indian software industry exceed, perhaps vastly, the direct 
benefits internalized by stakeholders of the industry. 
 
(e) A Tale of Two Software Firms 
In this section, we provide a more detailed description of two very successful 
firms in the Indian software industry, TCS affiliated with the Tata group, and Infosys, a 
new entrepreneurial venture arising out of the opportunities provided by the new 
economic environment.  Elsewhere, we have argued that there are two qualitatively 
different ‘solutions’ to the instutitional voids that hamper entrepreneurship in emerging 
markets. The first is for incumbent groups to leverage their internal access to capital and 
talent to start new ventures – this is the TCS story – and the second is for aspirants to tap 
into external institutions outside the country – this is the Infosys story (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2004). 
The stories of these two firms shows how group affiliated firms coexist 
successfully with independent entrepreneurial firms in this industry.  It also demonstrates 
that the success of group affiliated firms is attributable not to their ability to exploit 
government connections, but due to their ability to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities 
in the economy successfully. Finally, not only is it not the case that the group, the 
embodiment of concentrated ownership, deterred the entry of the unaffiliated firm, it 
actually laid the groundwork for a vast array of subsequent entrants.  
The founding of Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) in 1968 marks the birth of the 
first Indian domestic software firm at a time when IBM was riding herd in India.
17  TCS 
was set up by India’s oldest business group, the House of Tata, by pooling together 
management talent from existing Tata companies to create a new entity to act as an 
information technology bureau for various members of the Tata group. In two senses, it is 
the prototypical example of the filling of institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 
1999, 2000a,b), that is, of the creation by diversified business groups of internal solutions 
                                                 
17 The data, though not the interpretation, for the few paragraphs on the founding of TCS are from Kennedy 
(2001).   28
to compensate for the absence of external specialized intermediaries (institutional voids). 
The voids in question here refer to the absence of intermediaries facilitating the pooling 
of talent to launch such a company and the absence of an entity to provide information 
technology services to service the corporate demands of the time. 
Armed with the reputation of the Tata Group, and its track record in India, TCS 
sought business overseas, turning successfully to secure an alliance with Burroughs 
Corporation in the U.S., whereby Burroughs would secure programming contacts and 
TCS would execute them.  Under newly appointed CEO F. C. Kohli, TCS built up a 
credible list of major Indian customers between 1969 and 1973.
18    
It is important to realize that India’s distortionary foreign exchange regulations 
played a key role in prompting TCS to solicit business overseas. Foreign exchange was 
needed to pay for importing the hardware on which TCS performed its software 
programming services. It is also worth noting that such cross-border arrangements have 
been common in the history of the Tata group. For example, its ventures in the late 1990s 
included joint venture agreements with the likes of AT&T, NTT, Honeywell, Jardine 
Matheson, (the then) Daimler Benz, and numerous others. Elsewhere we have argued that 
the network of joint venture agreements represent credible commitments not to engage in 
short-term opportunistic behavior toward the marginal joint venture partner, and that the 
network itself is facilitated by the diverse (cross-industry) scope of the Tata Group 
(Khanna and Palepu 1997).  
Experience gained domestically and through Burroughs meant that TCS was well-
positioned when another distortionary Indian regulation – the requirement of divesting 
sufficient equity to local partners – forced IBM (and several other multinationals) out of 
India in 1977.  A separate entity – Tata Burroughs (later Tata Infotech) – was created to 
focus on business based on the Burroughs platform, while TCS decided to focus on the 
rising IBM platform in its outside-India work.  A U.S. office was opened in 1979 to 
solicit business and, with successful projects for various banks, American Express, IBM 
and others under its proverbial belt, TCS had established the industry, and its position, by 
the mid 1980s.  
                                                 
18 It is true that the MIT-trained Kohli’s own contacts in the U.S., as part of the IEEE association, no doubt 
played a facilitating role in securing contacts. But of course Tata’s had the reputation to attract someone of 
Kohli’s stature in the first instance.   29
In contrast to TCS, Infosys Technologies, another of India’s software success 
stories, is the prototypical example of building a business by leveraging external (i.e. 
non-India specific) institutions to compensate for domestic (India-specific) institutional 
voids. Narayan Murthy, the individual most associated with Infosys today, mused that the 
biggest challenge facing Infosys was “running a first-world firm in a third world country’ 
(Nanda and De Long, 2002, page 9). Infosys was founded in 1981 by seven 
entrepreneurs, all ex-employees of Patni Computer Systems (itself one of the entrants 
into the post-IBM-withdrawal vacuum). Its initial capital consisted of approximately 
$1,000 of personal savings and no Tata-like reputation to leverage.  However, at least one 
of the founders, Murthy, had his professional outlook sensitized to the importance of 
personal incentives by his own stint working outside India (Paris).  
Infosys struggled, teetering on the precipice of bankruptcy in 1989, until a foreign 
exchange crisis forces India to ‘open up.’  Reasons cited for Infosys’ early difficulties can 
reasonably be traced to pre-1991 institutional voids in product markets (lack of 
availability of quality hardware), capital markets (limited availability of financing for de 
novo entrepreneurs) and labor markets (visa restrictions preventing cross-border talent 
mobility). A lot of these constraints were removed when barriers to the flow of people, 
capital and ideas were relaxed so that Indosys software engineers could be relocated 
relatively easily to their customer sites, Infosys management did not spend excessive time 
circumventing regulations in New Delhi, foreign knowhow regarding the industry was 
accessible, and equity capital could be accessed locally through listings (which Infosys 
did in 1993). 
While the post-1991 liberalization eliminated some institutional voids, more 
fundamental ones remained. A Forbes article commented that there was a ‘perception that 
a smart, honest, reputable company could never come out of a country where cows still 
run in the street.’
19  A 1999 NASDAQ listing was designed to ameliorate informational 
problems that hampered Infosys reaching blue-chip companies in the global market. 
Several executives at Infosys and its competitors, and several regulators at Securities and 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI; India’s SEC equivalent) commented to us, for example, 
                                                 
19 Eric Pfeiffer, ‘From India to America,’ Forbes ASAP, August 23, 1999, pp. 19-24. Quoted in De Long 
and Nanda (2002: pp. 13).   30
that the NASDAQ listing was designed primarily to gain credibility with customers and 
to permit the issuance of dollar-denominated stock options to compete in global markets 
for talent.
20  For a company that, by this time, was not liquidity constrained, as we have 
demonstrated elsewhere (Khanna and Palepu, 2004), raising capital was not the reason to 
list overseas.  SEBI member Jayanth Verma’s comment to us regarding the spate of 
software listings overseas that followed is instructive.  “The industry that probably needs 
capital the least, went after the international capital markets most aggressively…. In fact 
many of these companies don’t know what to do with the capital they raised. .. The 
pressures that the capital markets can put on a company that doesn’t need to raise capital 
are next to nothing.”  
A few final points are worth noting. First, TCS’s moves arguably laid the 
foundation for the industry’s development. Azim Premji, founder of Wipro, India’s 
second largest software company and an NYSE-listed company, commented, ‘The legacy 
of the early pioneers – Tata Consultancy Services – was a growing number of foreign 
companies favorably impressed about what Indian companies could do in software’ 
(Ramamurti, 2001).   Thus, TCS, launched by the Tata group, far from deterring entry, 
appears to have facilitated it. 
 
VII. Discussion: The (socially useful) persistence of concentrated ownership 
 
In this section, we argue that the persistence of concentrated ownership is, in fact, 
a robust feature of many, if not most, emerging markets.  The story of the Indian software 
industry, and the (socially) useful role that business groups with concentrated ownership 
play in it, is not an artifact of serendipitous outcomes, but has generalizable aspects to it.  
In contrast, the literature’s current focus on the dark side of concentrated ownership, to 
the virtually complete exclusion of the positive aspects, has the potential to understate the 
beneficial aspects of such ownership, especially in emerging markets.  
                                                 
20 Note, however, that the international listing was not feasible until Infosys had a stable track record. As 
Azim Premji, CEO of rival Wipro commented, ‘It is also important to remember that Indian companies 
built their expertise serving domestic customers before venturing abroad’ (Ramamurti, 2001).  Even TCS 
ventured overseas after it had a strong domestic track record.   31
Consider other instances in space and time that are consistent with this idea of the 
socially productive longevity of concentrated ownership. We have focused on Chile in 
earlier work on the sustainability of business groups (Khanna and Palepu, 2000b) because 
Chile is the one country in modern economic history that has arguably undergone one of 
the most rapid movements toward a market economy, starting from the socialist society 
left behind by Salvador Allende in 1973 (following his overthrow by the right-wing 
General Augosto Pinochet).  In particular, Chilean markets are widely celebrated as being 
the best in Latin America especially since 1990. Thus, if one were to see business groups 
atrophy as external markets develop, this is where one ought to find the effect most 
glaringly. Our study confirmed that the value of business group affiliation fell during the 
ten years between 1987 and 1997. But business group affiliation, even in the relatively 
developed markets of the late 1990s, continued to be valuable. Our interpretation was that 
group capabilities, under attack in this instance since 1973 and especially since 1990, fall 
slowly. 
We supplemented this by detailed fieldwork in nine of Chile’s largest groups over 
the same time period (Khanna and Palepu, 1999). It is important to note that these were 
not the ten best performing groups. Here we found that these groups bucked the trend, so 
to speak, by not only improving their performance over this time period, but by 
increasing the trend toward greater concentration in ownership, greater family control and 
greater diversfication, all allegedly correlates of the deleterious effects of concentrated 
ownership. Similar field evidence was obtained and reported from India in the 1990-1997 
time period. 
The parallels with business groups in history are uncanny and relatively 
unexplored (Jones and Khanna, 2003). Here we draw largely on the work on 
multinational trading companies in the 1800s and 1900s by Geoffrey Jones (2000). 
Primarily around the mid 1800s, British trading houses in particular (and trading houses 
originating elsewhere in Europe to a lesser extent) were cross-border structural analogs of 
the sorts of contemporary business groups that one observes in Chile, India and elsewhere 
(Khanna, 2000).  In these trading companies, which Jones describes as business groups, 
the merchant house was the ‘core’ and was tied through a medley of contracts, informal   32
and formal, to a series of separately publicly quoted (traded) affiliates around the world, 
which operated in very diverse industries.  
Examples of such British trading companies included the Inchcape/Mackinnon 
group, a shipping enterprise spread over Asia and Australia, with a trading business in the 
Gulf, India and Africa, and plantations in India.  Another was Jardine Matheson, which 
originated as an opium trader between China and India and, drawing extensively on its 
Scottish heritage to source talent, evolved into a multinational business group with 
operations in China, and outposts in Japan, the U.S., South Africa and Peru, in diverse 
services and manufacturing businesses and an active venture capital business in mining 
worldwide. 
Some funds were draw from British (and other) expatriate savings in the colonies 
and from the London capital markets, and a lot of funds were sourced locally. That is, 
there was the structural issue of controlling and minority shareholders that we have 
already discussed as a hallmark of contemporary groups. Yet, as Jones points out, while 
the potential for minority shareholder exploitation existed in spades, there were very few 
such cases. Why? His answer is that reputation mattered, and these business groups 
sought to build trust by doing things like foregoing commissions (owed to the core firm 
by the affiliates as compensation for management services rendered) when times were 
bad. The groups referred to a ‘moral responsibility’ toward their affiliates.  Thus we have 
an instance where concentrated ownership appears to have exercised self-restraint, even 
amidst a weak corporate control environment, a factor that was probably associated with 
its longevity.  
Consider also the adaptability of this historical business group, another reason 
why the concentrated ownership has persisted. Continuing the examples above, the 
Inchcape group gradually divested from India in the late 1960s and 1970s as that country 
became less attractive, and also withdrew from the Middle East and Africa, ultimately 
reconfiguring itself as a group invested in Southeast Asia, Hong Kong and Australia. 
Jardines and Swires recovered from rather drastic business setbacks, including the 
Communist revolution in China, and reconfigured themselves as Hong Kong based 
groups, and entered numerous new businesses.  Such reconfigurations can be observed 
even in contemporary groups.  The Tata group started, for example, with a steel and   33
airlines and insurance in the 1800s, had to undergo nationalization and confiscation of 
several of its major businesses (including airlines and insurance), built up and eventually 
divested major businesses in consumer products, and most recently, entered, successfully, 
automobiles, and software.  Thus, TCS, discussed above, is a recent diversification of the 
Tata group. Similarly, the roughly $4 bn Ayala Group in the Philippines started with 
distilleries and has evolved into a real estate and financial services group as of the 1990s, 
and most recently as a major and very successful player in mobile telephony (Khanna, 
Palepu, and Vargas, 2004). 
Groups, and the concentrated ownership that they represent, whether in history or 
in contemporary emerging markets, are robust forms of business organizations. They 
potentially last centuries, changing their footprint and functional form, and weathering 
severe shocks. Whereas egregious violations and crony capitalism by groups are often 
reported (e.g. Fisman’s 2001 study of groups in Suharto’s Indonesia), the constructive 
stories are actually far more numerous, even though lacking the drama of exploitation. 
As a coda, it is worth commenting on the implicit counterfactual that underpins 
our assertion that groups are socially productive organizational forms. One should ask, 
what would happen if there were no groups?  Would organized commerce happen in 
quite the way that it does in emerging markets, when the specialized intermediation 
needed to facilitate arms-length transactions between buyers and sellers in all manner of 
markets are missing? We think not.  Such a world would be closer to first-best, but is also 
patently unrealistic. Then, a critic of groups might say, groups are sensible responses to 
the absence of specialized intermediation at a point in time, but their very presence deters 
the emergence of intermediaries. Therefore groups are self-perpetuating. There is some 
truth to this (Khanna, 2000), but it is a characterization that rings more true for extreme 
concentration of groups as in South Korea or South Africa, than for the ‘median’ 
emerging market.  
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Table 1 
Origin of Concentrated Ownership over the Years 
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 Table  2 






Private sector compared 
to public sector
a 
Indian private sector 
compared to all foreign 
companies
b 
# of Co.  16.92  17.18 
Sales 1.53  4.32 
Profits 2.22  3.87 
Assets 1.21  9.07 
Equity 0.51  6.71 
Source: Author’s calculations from a datebase maintained by the Center for Monitoring 
the Indian Economy (CMIE), Bombay, India. Found in Tarun Khanna, “Modern India,” 
HBS Case No. 979-108 (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 1997, p. 7. 
                                                 
a The private sector is comprised of Indian group-affiliated firms (IG) and Indian non-group affiliated firms 
(IN). The public sector is comprised of central and state government owned firms (P). This column depicts, 
for each category, the ratio (IG+IN) / P. (i.e. there are 16.92 times as many companies in the private sector 
as there are in the public sector, but total sector sales are only 1.53 times greater than total public sector 
sales.) 
b This column depicts the Indian private sector relative to foreign firms (F), i.e., the ratio: (IG+IN) / F.   40
 
Table 3 
Comparison of Group and Non-Group Firms Listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange 
in 1993. 
 Group Firms  Nongroup  Firms 
Variables Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Sales (million of 
rupees) 
1,411 666  366  217 
Age (years)       28.3   22    19.8   14 
Tobin’s q         1.39     1.14      1.37     1.06 




     10.1 
 
   2.3 
 
    7.4 
 
   0.9 








  11.3 
 
   6.5 
Ownership by insiders 
(%) 
     31.9   31.3    20.8   17.1 
Directors’ ownership 
(%) 
      5.7     1.1    14.2   10.7 
Top fifty owners 
excluding the above  
categories (%) 
 
      4.9 
 
   3.2 
 
    7.6 
 
   5 
Number of firms    567  567  437  437 
Source: Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu, “Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign 
Intermediaries, and Corporate Governance,” in Concentrated Corporate Ownership, ed. 
Randall K. Morck (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), P. 276.  Data 
obtained from the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) for 567 affiliates 
of 252 different groups and for 437 unaffiliated firms traded on the BSE. 
 
Note: The summary statistics in this table are based on 1993 values. Tobin’s q is defined 
as (market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book value of debt)/(book 
value of assets). Sales are measured in millions of rupees, with an approximate exchange 
rate at this time of U.S. $1.00 = Rs 30.00. Age measures number of years since 
incorporation. Foreign institutional ownership aggregates ownership of foreign 
corporations as well as that of foreign financial intermediaries. Domestic institutional 
ownership aggregates ownership in the hands of all state-run financial intermediaries.  
Insider ownership includes the stakes held by group family members and by other group 
firms and measures stakes held by insiders for nongroup firms. Directors’ ownership 
captures the ownership of nonfamily directors. Top fifty ownership captures the largets 
shareholders not included in the aforementioned categories. Group membership is based 
on definitions of groups from CMIE (see text of paper for comments). The mean and 
median values for all the variables except for the mean value of Tobin’s q and change in 
Tobin’s q are significantly different between the group and nongroup firms at the 5 
percent significance level.   
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Table 4 
Top 50 Indian Business Groups down the Years** 
Courtesy Dr Gita Piramal 
 1939*  1969°  1997# 
 Group  Asset
s 
Group Assets  Group Assets 
 1  Tata  62.42  Tata  505.36  Tata  37510.8
0 
 2  Martin Burn  18.02  Birla  456.40  BK-KM Birla  19497.9
4 
 3  Bird  12.40  Martin Burn  153.06  Reliance  19345.5
9 
 4  Andrew Yule  12.38  Bangur  104.31  RPG  9664.12 
 5  Inchcape  10.70  Thapar  98.80  Essar  9593.78 
 6  E D Sassoon  9.56  S Nagarmull  95.61  OP Jindal  5456.10 
 7  ACC  8.68  Mafatlal  92.70  MAC  4782.10 
 8  Begg  5.75  ACC  89.80  LM Thapar  4434.09 
 9  Oriental 
Tel&Elec 
5.60 Walchand  81.11  Ispat  4425.35 
 
10 
Dalmia 5.51  Shriram  74.13  Group  USHA  4210.87 
 
11 
Jardine 5.33  Bird  Heilgers  68.62  Lalbhai  4112.44 
 
12 
Wallace Bros  5.33  JK Singhania  66.84  Videocon  3737.87 
 
13 
Birla 4.85  Goenka  65.34  Lloyd  Steel  3705.27 
 
14 
Wadia  4.70  Sahu Jain  58.75  Bajaj Group  3415.87 
 
15 







Finlay  3.84  Sarabhai  56.72  Hari S Singhania  3275.80 
 
17 
Scindia 3.66  Scindia  55.99  KK  Birla 3094.90 
 
18 
Killick 3.51  Lalbhai  51.20  Torrent  3077.23 
 
19 
Kilburn 3.23  Killick 51.08  Hinduja  2967.20 
 
20 
Sarabhai 3.00  ICI  50.06  Arvind  Mafatlal  2862.94 
 
21 







2.80 TVS  43.83  Escorts  2642.22   42
 1939*  1969°  1997# 
 Group  Asset
s 
Group Assets  Group Assets 
 
23 
Steel Bros  2.77  Kirloskar  43.02  Mahindra   2633.70 
 
24 
MacLeod 2.67  Parry  41.93 GP  Goenka 2630.43 
 
25 
Walchand  2.61  Jardine Hend.  40.19  CK Birla  2530.32 
 
26 
Lawrie 2.55  Mahindra  38.58  Kirloskar  2622.61 
 
27 
Thackersey 2.56  Bajaj  35.28  Nagarjuna  2511.54 
 
28 





BIC 2.38  Seshasayee  32.72  Indo  Rama  2440.88 
 
30 
Lalbhai 2.33  Gill 
Arbuthnot 
29.02 UB  Group  2414.65 
 
31 
Kettlewell 2.23  Kilachand  27.22  Kalyani  2395.29 
 
32 
Gillanders  2.16  Dalmia J  26.72  GE Shipping  2357.59 
 
33 
Shri Ram  2.16  Naidu GV  26.41  Oswal Agro  2342.36 
 
34 
Swedish Match  2.05  Shapoor 
Pallonji 







23.15 Manu  Chhabria  2286.02 
 
36 
Shaw 1.95  Ruia~  22.40  TS  Santhanam  2214.06 
 
37 
CV Mehta  1.90  Naidu VR  21.55  SK Birla  2080.11 
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Daga 1.67  Wadia  20.56  Modern  1967.85 
 
40 
Forbes 1.59  Shaw  Wallace  20.14  MM  Thapar  1963.47 
 
41 
Harvey 1.50  Murugappa  20.07  Ranbaxy 1875.71 
 
42 





Spencer 1.38  RamaKrishna  18.79  Finolex    1712.73   43
 1939*  1969°  1997# 
 Group  Asset
s 
Group Assets  Group Assets 
 
44 
Williamson 1.23  Chinai  18.36  Godrej  1695.97 
 
45 
Harrisons 0.89  Jaipuria  18.24 BPL  1691.57 
 
46 
Henderson 0.63  Kamani  18.05  Vinod  Doshi 1519.89 
 
47 
C Jehangir  0.42  Rallis  17.94  Usha Martin  1514.06 
 
48 
Turner 0.39  Thackersey  17.19  OWM  1412.76 
 
49 
Provident 0.34  Thiagaraja  16.55 Amalgamation  1353.47 
 
50 
J Warren  0.22  Swedish 
Match 
15.70 Vardhman  1282.40 
 
Source:  
* compiled from Claude Markovits, Indian Business & Nationalist Politics. P192-3. 
Significant exclusions (for a miscellaneous bunch of reasons) from the list are: BAT, 
Thomas Duff, J Taylor, Assam Company, Burmah Oil, F Peek and Hukumchand. As we 
are concerned only with Indian groups and as rankings are not relevant for the purpose of 
this article, we can safely assume that all the key Indian business houses have been 
accounted for the pre-independence period in the table. 
° compiled from Report of the Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee, 1969. 
# Business Today. 
~ Ruia in 1969 list should not be confused with Essar Ruia of the 1997 list.  
 
** Assets in RsCr. Normally sales or market cap are the accepted international criteria for 
ranking business performance. However assets have been taken in this case for the sake 
of uniformity. Accurate, reliable and complete data for Indian business houses by sales is 
not available pre-1984.   44
Table 5 









Telephone & Teleg 
Co 
International 
Business Machs Cor 
Microsoft Corp 
2 General  Motors 
Corp 
American 
Telephone & Teleg 
Co 
General Electric Co 
3  Du Pont E I De 
Nemours & Co 
General Motors 
Corp 
Cisco Systems Inc 
4  Standard Oil Co NJ  Eastman Kodak Co  Wal Mart Stores Inc 
5  General Electric Co  Standard Oil Co NJ  Exxon Mobil Corp 
6  Union Carbide & 
Carbon Corp 
Sears Roebuck & 
Co 
Intel Corp 
7  United States Steel 
Corp 
Texaco Inc  Lucent 
Technologies Inc 
8 International  Nickel 
Co CDA Ltd 
Xerox Corp  International 
Business Machs Cor 
9  Texas Co  General Electric Co  Citigroup Inc 
10  Sears Roebuck & 
Co 
Gulf Oil Corp  America Online Inc 
11  Coca Cola Co  Minnesota Mining 




12  Kress SH & Co  Du Pont E I De 




13  Allied Chemical & 
Dye Corp 
Avon Products Inc  AT&T Corp 
14 Procter  &  Gamble 
Co 
Coca Cola Co  Oracle Corp 
15  Eastman Kodak Co  Mobil Oil Corp  Home Depot Inc 
16 Kennecott  Copper 
Corp 
Procter & Gamble 
Co 
Merck & Co Inc 
17  Standard Oil Co 
IND 
Standard Oil Co 
California 
MCI WorldCom Inc 
18  Chrysler Corp  Polaroid Corp  Procter & Gamble 
Co 
19  Socony Vacuum Oil 
Inc 
Merck & Co Inc  Coca Cola Co 




21 Reynolds RJ  American Home  Dell Computer Corp   45
Tobacco Co  Products Corp 
22 Consolidated  Edison 
Co NY Inc 
International Tel & 
Teleg Corp 
Johnson & Johnson  
23 Commonwealth 
Edison Co 




24  United Gas Impt Co  Johnson & Johnson  Pfizer Inc 
25  Standard Oil Co 
California 
International Nickel 
Co CDA Ltd 
Sun Microsystems 
Inc 
26 Chesapeake  &  Ohio 
Railway Co 





Shell Oil Co  Hewlett Packard Co 
28  Norfolk & Western 
Railway Co 
Ford Motor Co Del  Yahoo Inc 
29 Westinghouse 
Electric & Mfg Co 
Burroughs Corp  EMC Corp MA 
30 Montgomery  Ward 
& Co 
Penney JC Inc  Bell Atlantic Corp 








33 Bethlehem  Steel 
Corp 
Weyerhaeuser Co  Bank of America 
Corp 




Time Warner Inc 
35  American Tob Co  Georgia Pacific 
Corp 
Morgan Stanley 
Dean Witter and Co 
36  General Foods Corp  Union Carbide Corp  Daimlerchrysler AG 
Stuttgart 
37 Roan  Antelope 
Copper Mines Ltd 








39  Penney JC Inc  Bristol Myers Co  American Express 
Co 
40  Pacific Telephone & 
Teleg Co  
Honeywell Inc  BP Amoco PLC 
41 Liggett  &  Myers 
Tob Co 
RCA Corp  Lilly Eli & Co 
42  Parke Davis & Co  Warner Lambert 
Pharmaceutical Co 
Warner Lambert Co 
43  Pacific Gas & Elec 
Co 
Dow Chemical Co  Du Pont E I De 
Nemours & Co 
44 Union  Pacific 
Railroad Co 
General Foods Corp  GTE Corp   46
45  Phelps Dodge Corp  Imperial Oil Ltd  Wells Fargo & Co 




47 Phillips  Petroleum 
Co 





Kresge SS Co  Chase Manhattan 
Corp New 




50 Wrigley  William  Jr 
Co 





Source: Compustat, based on market values. 
   47
Table 6 
Persistence of Dominance of Indian Groups and U.S. firms over 60 Years 
 








Birth  32 43 28 37 
RankUp  6 3 7 5 
RankDown 10  3  15  6 
RankUp10  5 2 1 2 
RankDown10  5 1 4 3 
RankSame  2 1 0 2 
 
Birth refers to the number of groups or firms that are ‘born’ in the 30-year window in question, that is, that 
enter the top 50 list for that country in that time window, given that they were not part of the list in the 
previous 30 year window (there are no groups or firms that exit and then re-enter the top 50 list in either 
country).  RankUp refers to the number of groups or firms that rise in the asset-based size rankings. A 
smaller rank measures a larger group or firm, with rank=1 and rank=50 being the largest and the smallest of 
the top-50 groups or firms in each country in each time period.  RankUp10 counts the groups or firms 
whose rank rises by more than 10.  RankDown and RankDown10 are defined analogously. RankSame 
counts the number of groups or firms whose rank remains unchanged during that 30 year period.  
 




Structure of Indian Software Exports Industry 
 
  No. of Companies  
Annual turnover  2000-01  2001-02 
    
Above Rs. 1,000 crore  5  5 
Rs. 500 crore – Rs. 1,000 crore   7  5 
Rs. 250 crore – Rs. 500 crore  14  15 
Rs. 100 crore – Rs. 250 crore  28  27 
Rs. 50 crore – Rs. 100 crore  25  55 
Rs. 10 crore – Rs. 50 crore  193  220 
Below Rx. 10 crore  544  2,483 
Note: In 2001-02, companies under Rs. 10 crore revenues included non-NASSCOM 
member companies. 
 
Source: Adapted from “NASSCOM: Strategic Review 2003: The IT Industry in India”    
( New Delhi, 2003). Available from the National Association of Software and Service 
Companies.   49
Table 8 
 
Top 20 IT Software and Services Exporters from India 
 
Rank  Company  Rs. core  US$ million 
1  Tata Consultancy Services  3,882  813 
2  Infosys Technologies Limited  2,553  535 
3  Wipro Technologies  2,256  481 
4  Satyam Computer Services Limited  1,703  357 
5  HCL Technologies. Ltd.  1,319  277 
6  IBM Global Services India Pvt. Ltd.  764  160 
7  Patni Computer Services  732  153 
8  Silverline Technologies  603  126 
9  Mahindra-British Telecom Limited  541  113 
10  Pentasoft Technologies Ltd.  459  96 
11  HCL Perot Systems Ltd.  449  94 
12  Pentamedia Graphics Ltd.  431  90 
13  NIIT Limited  400  84 
14  Mascot Systems Ltd.  399  84 
15  i-Flex Solutions Ltd.  392  82 
16  Digital Globalsoft Ltd.  331  69 
17  Mphasis BFL Group (Consolidated)  313  66 
18  Mascon Global Limited  307  64 
19  Orbitech 264  55 
20  Mastek Limited  259  54 
Source: Adapted from “NASSCOM: Strategic Review 2003: The IT Industry in India”    
( New Delhi, 2003). Available from the National Association of Software and Service 
Companies.  
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Table 9 
A Comparison of the large US and Indian Software Companies 
 
  Revenues 
June 2002, 











 $ million 
U.S. 
Companies 
    
Accenture 11,600  3.9  75,000  12,400 
CSC 11,500  4.7  67,000  4,800 











Sapient 217  N/A  2,427  123 
     
Indian 
Companies 
    
HCL Tech  340  28.1  5,587  1,209 
Infosys 571  32.1  10,470 7,140 
Satyam 421  26.7  9,532  1,370 
TCS 810  25  19,000  8,100 
Wipro 734  24.5  13,800  6,340 
Source: Adapted from “NASSCOM Newsline, November 2002”  (2002). Available from 
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Table 10 












Total Sales (%) 
1987-88  Rs. 0.70  $52  Rs. 1.00  41 
1990-91  Rs. 2.50  $128  Rs. 2.25  52 
1991-1992  Rs. 4.30  $164  Rs. 3.20  57 
1992-93  Rs. 6.70  $225  Rs. 4.90  57 
1993-94  Rs. 10.20  $330  Rs. 6.95  59 
1994-95  Rs. 15.30  $485  Rs. 10.70  59 
1995-96  Rs. 25.20  $735  Rs. 16.70  60 
1996-97  Rs. 39.00  $1,110  Rs. 25.00  61 
1997-98  Rs. 65.30  $1,790  Rs. 35.80  64 
1998-99  Rs. 109.00  $2,650  Rs. 49.50  68 
1999-00  Rs. 171.50  $4,000  Rs. 94.10  70 
2000-01  Rs. 283.50  $6,230  Rs. 98.90  74 
2001-02  Rs. 365.00  $7,680  Rs. 115.00  76 
 
Note: The figures for the domestic software activity do not include in-house development 
of software by end users, which is presumed to be a considerable amount.  
 
Source: Adapted from Pankaj Ghemawat, “The Indian Software Industry in 2002,” HBS 
Case No. 700-036 (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2002), p. 20. Data from 
NASSCOM; Heeks, R. India’s Software Industry: State Policy, Liberalisation and 
Development, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996). 
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Figure 1 
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Source: Bombay House, Tata Group, Jan 2004